متن انگلیسی کتاب روانشناسی و روح بخش ششم
متن انگلیسی کتاب روانشناسی و روح بخش ششم اثر اتو رنک
Soul and Will
Divinity, joined to thy will, Rises from its eathly throne
Schiller
The primitive indification of dream and reality, and the willed translation of dream into action, which survive even in our modern point of view, bring us to willing, which is the psychological problem par excellence. As in my will psychology and will therapy,1
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1 Truth and Reality; Sketch of a Spiritual Philosophy (Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit; Entwurf einer Philosophic des Seelischen), 1929; and The Analytic Reaction in its Constructive Aspects (Die analytische Reaktion in ihren konstruktiven Elementen), 1929. Both published by F. Deuticke Press, Vienna and Leipzig.
I substitute this problem for the narcissistic one of the wish. It was the will to live, and not death anxiety, which produced belief in immortality, and it is the will which creates the dream. The dream seems to prove freedom of will to us as completely as it did to primitive man who translated his dream into reality. While the soul and body had originally been united in one being, primitive man began to interpret this freedom of the will as freedom of the soul from the body. But in his dream life his own soul's freedom of will was opposed by that of other souls which seemed to appear in his dream as uninvited visitors. Early metaphysicists explained the dream on the basis of a temporary withdrawal of the will during sleep. Freud, who regarded willing as the driving power of the dream, denied this freedom because he needed neither the soul nor willing to demonstrate the causal determination of psychic events. But the will problem cannot be solved by the dream or by any particular spiritual phenomenon, since it represents a phenomenon already affected by spiritual belief and interpreted in relation to it. Spiritual belief itself proves to be an expression of the will to live.
The single real obstacle which freedom of will encounters is death, which it conquers by spiritual belief. Though it may seem curious, this victory of will over death appears to have been portrayed by primitive man's actual behavior. In the traditions of the Traveler, Faster, etc., which were cited in the preceding chapter, the hero's attainment of immortality was independent of others' death which the water spirit had promised him. It seems almost as if primitive man died in order not to get killed. Again, this does not signify self-preservation, but a "causal" proof that the individual will is god even over death which it can cause. Evidence of one's own power of will in the struggle with death appears also in suicide, which is possible and understandable only as a victory of will over death. Primitive man could comprehend only a "willed" death resulting from his transgression of a tabu, a phenomenon which we encounter at the psychological stage in the form of a wish to die, which Freud interpreted biologically as a "death instinct." But this wish to die represents only a will victory for the individual who creates a voluntary affirmation out of uncompromising necessity. Although death formerly appeared as a result of one's own mistakes, it was subsequently brought about by one's own desire, and at no time was it a fate thrust upon the individual, but a destiny which the individual took it upon himself to effect.
Up to this point we have been considering principally the emergence of the idea of fear and death from spiritual belief. We turn now to the positive side of spirituality, which primitives regarded as an expression of life power. "Tanud," the word for the soul, also means life-power and shadows among the aborigines of New Mecklenburg, and thus con2.notes life as well as death.
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2 According to Heinrich Cunow: Origin of Religion and Belief in God (Ursprung der Religion und des Gottesglaubens ) , Berlin, 1923.
Most primitives express these two ideas by different spiritual symbols. In the Salomo Islands off the coast of Florida, the soul was called "tarunga," or life-power, as long as it dwelt in the body; but after death when it had assumed the form of its former bodily host it was called "tindal," or spirit-being.
On Maewo, (Aurora) the northernmost island of theNew Hebrides, the incarnate soul was called "tamani," or life-spirit (from "ata" or spirit, and "mani" or life); when separated from the body, and in its own proper form, it was called "tamate" or death-spirit. On Efata the soul which dwelt in the human body was called "atamauri" (from "ata" or spirit, and "mauri" or life), but when it became free to assume its own form it became "atamate" ( from "ata," or spirit, and "mate" meaning death or the dead). (From Cunow, p. 35.)
Corresponding differentiations among spiritual concepts are to be found among the Polynesian and Micronesian peoples of the South Seas. These are not only related to the two souls of the North American Indians mentioned above, but to the dual meaning of the soul concept itself in relation to life (power) and death (anxiety).
In order to understand this positive and creative meaning of spirituality we may recall that ethnologists assume a preanimistic stage of "emanism" to have been the oldest in human culture. The idea basic to emanism was that of "mana," as the Melanesians termed that supernatural power which almost all peoples know under one name or another (the "Orenda" of the Iroquois, "Wakanda" of the Sioux, "Tjurunga" of the Australians, "Brahma" of the Hindus, etc.). Ethnologists have found it quite hard to clarify the idea of "mana," although primitive man appeared to be quite clear about it in spite of the supernatural characteristics which he ascribed to it. From an extensive literature I may cite a few characteristics of this concept in order to show the degree to which carefully defined views of primitives cover what I have designated psychologically as will.3
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3 See particularly the outstanding presentation by Karl Bethe: Religion and Magic. A Contribution by History of Religion to the Psychological Foundations of Religious Dogma. (Religion und Magie. Ein religionsgeschichtlicher Beitrag zur psychologischen Grundlegung der religiosen Prinzipienlehre), second edition, Leipzig, 1927.
Thus the missionary bishop Codrington ( The Melancsians,1891), who was one of the most thorough scholars of the Samoan Archipelago, says:
There is a belief in a power which is entirely different from natural power, which effects good and evil in all possible ways and which it is to one's greatest advantage to possess or control. That is "mana." ... It is unnatural but in a certain sense supernatural power or influence; yet it manifests itself in natural forces and in any kind of power or superiority which the individual human may possess. ... As far as religious customs, offerings, and sacrifices go, all Melanesian religion amounts to obtaining this mana for oneself, or to being allowed to use it for one's needs.. . . This mana is not tied to any particular thing, and it can be applied anywhere. Spirits, souls separated from bodies, and supernatural beings possess it, and can impart it.
Though conceived impersonally, this power is "always bound to some person who controls it," and one expects him who is gifted with the power to achieve unusual things. Humans who have it and whom we currently call "strong personalities," use it to rise to power over others, as shamans, priests, doctors, and kings. Every manifest accomplishment of a person evidences his possession of mana.
There is no doubt that in all its aspects this power corresponds to the human will, which is the creative personality I have described particularly as a power standing outside and over natural causality. For, according to Codrington's further description of this concept, which comes to us as it were out of a clear sky, mana is "that invisible power which the aborigines believe causes all effects transcending the usual course of natural events." It is "the active power in everything they do, and which they believe occurs in white or black magic. By means of it humans are in a position to govern and control nature," and to use it "to their own advantage" (Codrington, op. cit., p. 118, footnote). Tregear, the lexicographer of Polynesian dialects, frankly defines mana as psychic energy; Hubert and Mauss essentially refer every expression of power to it, and the Encyclopedia Britannica defines it as "magical power invested in individuals whose wills rule the universe."
However, primitive conceptions of mana not only recognize but also try to explain this particularly personal will power in individuals. This first animistic explanation of the will problem which we have regarded as an early step towards psychology was spiritual and not psychological. It underlay the Platonic world-soul, the Hellenistic doctrine of pneuma, Schelling's romantic nature-soul, Aristotle's doctrine of body and soul, Leibnitz's doctrine of the monad, and modern vitalism. In animism we have seen how everything supernatural was derived from the spiritual interpretation of the will as a psychic phenomenon because, as something invisible and ineffable, the will defied causal comprehension. The origin and effect of will expressions were incalculable, and will power itself was incomprehensible and therefore unnatural. But even the magical transference of will power, which we currently call suggestion without understanding it any better than did primitive man, is in itself puzzling enough, and certainly seems supernatural. Therefore it is not to be wondered that this mysterious power was considered as the "cause" of such an inexplicable and important fact as death.
Since the belief that anyone could die a natural death was foreign to primitives, 4 death was regarded as being effected by another person's mana, and since this other person could be either dead or alive, this view led forthwith to a belief in demons. However, we recognize in these propositions a fact important for the treatment of our next chapter: that because of their causal incomprehensibility, just these simple human phenomena of will and death were regarded as supernatural. They were related to natural forces only at a much later period, not because they were derived from such forces, but because these forces made them more comprehensible.
4 Spencer and Gillen: The Primitives of Central Australia, p. 476. Karl von den Steinen, in his With the Primitives of Central Brazil (Unter den Naturvolkern Zentralbrasiliens ) says of the Bakairi that they do not recognize the necessity of death, and generally know no "musts."
In this connection it is important to note that although mana was to be found in every unusual object of nature and human life, it was not bound up with any idea of a higher divine or spiritual being, but was rather a concept of power. At this period the being most highly gifted with mana was just the strong-willed human who interfered with the course of natural events and determined the fate of other humans. It was only gradually that this psychological will concept came to be allied with the soul, and with the godhead which at a later period came to represent the soul. This evolution, which began with the first animistic will theory, is one which we would like principally to pursue for the moment. Corresponding to the two souls, or to the dualistic view of the soul concept, there are two roots of religion which have never really grown together even in highly monotheistic systems. These roots are: the idea of God, and belief in immortality. In following the development of immortality belief from the individual body-soul to a belief in collective rebirth, we have differentiated spiritual rebirth of the animistic era from bodily rebirth in the sexual era, of which elements Christianity appears to have achieved a sublime synthesis. However, the concept of God as a higher Being equipped with supernatural power was developed not from death anxiety, but from the wish to live, whose energetic power was expressed in the concept of mana. In other words, God was a personification of the individual will-ego, and was felt to be immortal, both because he possessed mana, and because the soul corresponded to a collective immortality whose ego had to be protected from the threat of death. Thus the soul was the general mana of all, or the folk-mana which the community acquired by levies upon personalities gifted with mana, and which to some degree religion made available to all. Hence the primitive rule that the bearer of mana must use his power not to his own advantage, but to that of the commonwealth or tribe (to which, for example, the fathers in the Traveler and Faster stood opposed).
At a very much earlier stage the concept of the soul appeared allied with mana or life power, and as the cited linguistic relationships show, the immortal soul was originally identified with mana. In totemistic systems this surviving individual soul was united with the collective soul or generic totem, which finally evolved into the idea of God. This spirit-god already represented collective immortality, and for that reason all individuals were obliged to believe in him lest they lose his favor. Contemporary with this spirit-god, if not with his earlier prototypes, there was the will-god who personified not the collective soul or immortality, but an augmented mana or individual survival. For what mana made so clear, particularly in its magic practices, was the belief that this supernatural power could even protect and preserve life or cause death. This explains the now established "fact that one finds in a remarkably large number of lower cultures a belief in an exalted heavenly deity" ( Bethe, p. 332 ) which, over and above all possible forms of spiritual belief, "appears as an autochthonous religious concept."5
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5 In The Origin of the Idea of God ( Der Ursprung der Gottcsidee, Munster, formerly two volumes), W. Schmidt has developed from this point the hypothesis of a primal monotheism. The merit of the contribution by Taylor, who first comprehended and formulated animism from an anthropological point of view, is considerably reduced by two defects in this theory which, on the one hand, conceives of the animistic soul too rationalistically and causally, and, on the other, confuses it with the religious concept of God. A. Lang, in The Making of Religion, has corrected this error by his penetrating reference to two different factors in the formation of religion. (Compare with this theme the basic presentation by J. Pascher: The Concept of the Soul in Taylors "Animism" (Der Seelenbegriff in Animismus Taylors), Wiirzbiirg, 1929.)
For, as is the case among a few African tribes (loc. cit., p. 349) or among Australian aborigines, it represents certainly not the souls of the dead, but a magnified superman who never dies.
This appears to be borne out by Strehlow's 6 demonstration that in the Arandas' language (Old Jirerama) the word for dream means "god-seeing." Although Strehlow adds that it is not the highest god in Heaven but a totem god which the aborigine believes he sees in his dream, it seems to me that this does not prove the identity of this heavenly deity with the aborigine's ancestors. For what appears in the dream is certainly the true will-ego which the Australian aborigine interprets so as to vindicate his totemistic ideology, just as we use it to justify the natural science ideology of our psychological era.
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6 The Aranda and Loritja tribes in Central Australia ( Die Aranda- und Loritja-Stamme in Zentralaustralien ) See also Spencer and Gillen: The Arunta, London, 1927.
Egyptologists have recently been inclined to agree with theologists that real religion begins beyond emanism, animism, totemism, and even beyond primitive monotheism in which God merely represented an exalted self. I believe, however, that decisive criteria for the beginning of the religious era can be established only through psychological understanding, and not on the basis of voluminous ethnological facts or theological dogma. Such understanding is possible only by a return to such fundamental psychic phenomena as the will, and it cannot be achieved by psychoanalysis' causal reduction of religion to reality, which itself corresponds to an earlier interpretation of psychic facts. For emanism, and animism which is based on emanism, were spiritual attempts to explain the will problem in the sense of belief in individual immortality, just as totemism corresponded to a concretion of animism in the sense of procreative rebirth. All these spiritual theories about psychic and biological facts were used as materials with which to create religion.This creation did not consist of a mere fusion of theory into a simple capacity to resign oneself and believe, as happened with the will- and soul-gods. Rather is real religion characterized by a certain new attitude toward these spiritually interpreted human facts, and this attitude can be explained only through psychological understanding.
From a pure ego psychology, which for myself had finally crystallized into willing as the crucial personality problem, I have been led to a will-god without considering ethnological materials or theological points of view at all. 6a Yet I can understand this elevation of the ego religiously only to the extent of its alliance with negative will or with selfresignation and humiliation. The new attitude which manifested itself as "religious" was that which came to use such prereligious spiritual creations as the will-god to justify individual willing. Only with this moral tendency to justify does naive projection of life power into spiritual immortality acquire that ethical stamp which we associate with religion. Yet how did it happen that, under pressure of moral compulsion, the individual's compulsion to justify himself and his willing changed from a positive force of self-affirmation and action into a negative attitude of self-disparagement and subjugation? Timid reverence before supernatural and otherworldly events was not the primary attitude of natural man, who was much more concerned with his own problems than with those of nature and the universe. Reverent humility before exalted beings was just a result of this reevaluation of will, from which arose the concepts of guilt and sin.
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6a See in Truth and Reality (Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit ) , especially the chapter "Creation and guilt" (Schaffen und Schuld). The general notion of the creation of God in man's image was apparently expressed first by Aristotle: "Man forms the external features and the living relations between his gods according to his own image" ( Politics, I, 7 ) . In his Natural History of Religion, Hume subsequently developed the thought that the pressures of social living, and not those of natural influences, determine man's religious ideas. Finally, Ludwig Feuerbach psychologized this religious anthropology, because he explained God in terms of the divine likeness of man, and considered gods as the creations of human wishes and needs. See The Nature of Christianity (Das Wesen des Christentums), 1841.
We should like to try to understand spiritually this ancient and fundamental problem of religion, this moral attitude toward the will and its interpretation as evil, which we encounter in the concepts of guilt and sin as personal offenses. In the later traditions of the sexual era, which regard woman as the chief evil and sexuality as the "cause" of mortality, we discover only ancient spiritual belief recast into the new ideology of procreative immortality. That is to say, the curse of sexuality follows from its destruction of man's belief in individual immortality. We may also recall that, as long as its necessity was denied, natural death, which was the first evil known to man, was believed to follow from his own trangressions. Primitive traditions have given us much information concerning these transgressions, which always aimed essentially at winning individual immortality but were always punished by death.
The conflict between the individual mortal soul and the collective immortal soul originating from the life strength of mana continued in the religious personifications of the will-god and soul-god. The reevaluation of will which produced real religion had already been introduced by the indivictual's cession of mana to society, or of the power of a living soul to the souls of the dead which, as demons, became even more powerful than the living bearer of mana. Thus fear of the denied necessity of dying first entered primitive consciousness as a fear of the dead, rather than of death itself. For with the few exceptions of the nearest relatives, the dead used their mana primarily to kill or capture the living in order to restore themselves through the latters' life force. Herein lay the origin of spirit and ancestral cults, as Australian negroid culture so well exemplifies. 7 The living presented even blood-offerings to their dead ancestors and sought to restrain their dead enemies, in order that they could retain their life power for themselves. The sacrifices which serve essentially to protect the one making them amount more or less to surrendering one's individuality to the community, but in this case to the community of the dead, whose demands upon primitive man were more imperative than were those which elicited his complete and automatic surrender to the community of the living. The dead comprised an immanent threat to vital existence, and to the continuing spiritual existence which society quite straightforwardly guaranteed.
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7 See especially, A. W. Howitt: Native Tribes of Southeast Australia.
This fear of the dead, which led to a voluntary relinquishment of mana or to a self-restriction of will, became religious self-subjugation by a process described spiritually as a progressive fusion of will-god with soul-god. This prereligious evolution is paralleled by the animistic replacement of belief in individual immortality by a collective spiritual belief. Only with the will- and the soul-god, man had already gone back to the preanimistic ego stage, because he was again personifying the collective will as he had the collective soul, namely, as images of single individuals and of their individual wills and souls. Meanwhile collectivistic ideology of immortality had become so much more powerful than naive immortality of the self, that the attempt to perpetuate the originally mana-laden will-man as a combined will- and soul-god had to fail. Instead, the individual will-god became absorbed by the collective will-god, just as the individual soul had previously been captured by the totem soul, and the individual by society.
Spiritual fear of the dead now became fear of the new god who represented spiritual belief and mana belief as individual and collective immortality. For this deity's will power was so weakened by concessions to the all-spiritual, and his stamina so undermined by the continuing claims of individuals, that he could support belief neither in personal nor communal immortality. He became a Janus-faced symbol of that raging conflict between the individual's two souls which leads to the knowledge and recognition of death. Death, the original and sole evil in the world, could no longer be denied. Its inevitability, which was not yet conceded, was interpreted morally and not spiritually. Denied, death again emerged as an evil, now no longer projected on the evil spirits of the dead, demons, evil-wishing mana bearers or sorcerers, but interpreted as a moralistic concept of guilt and sin, and damned for what it was in relation to man. In other words, at this religious stage neither the wish for immortality nor that for sexuality was the cause of death; it was the will which demanded even the death that was the root of all evil. At the same time the damnation of will became transferred to the new god, who then punished as well as "rewarded." But man's submission to this godhead was only a submission to the power of death, which recognized the moralistic form of self-abasement and the vanity of human existence. We can discern here the moralistic formulation of the original immortality ideology, to the effect that man was the cause of his own death because death was otherwise impossible. But the godhead which could now kill was that same will which had once guaranteed man eternal life and immortality, a will now weakened and broken by the knowledge of death's inevitability.
The most outstanding type of this religiously revalued will-god was the Hebrews' Jahweh who in other respects was purely monotheistic in character. However, this monotheism was a maturing rather than a primitive one, and it was a synthesis of various prereligious conceptions into a religious godhead whose essence lay in just the unification of the soul-, will-, and death-gods into one entity. This deity manifested traits of the earthly mana bearers whose will8 could effect good or evil, and the corresponding Doubletrait of the beneficent or malignant souls of the dead. lie was a typical incarnation of will justification and a personification of moral principle itself. Modern critics of the Bible have traced his apparent unity back to three different sources which may be brought into harmony with the three prereligious belief forms which we have already considered. A recent incisive study based on Bachofen's views makes it likely that the Jahwehistic literary sources were colored by the preceding matriarchial culture in contrast with the literature of the priesthood in which patriarchy was dominant. "Matriarchy and patriarchy compete in original biblical history, with the tendency toward final conquest of matriarchy predominating. In the story of Genesis the priesthood celebrates the victory of the paternal light principle."9
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8 The Elohim-conccpt of the Pentateuch is not a symbol of good, but of power which was used on things as well as man. See Goldberg's: The Reality of the Hebrews (Die Wirklichkeit der Hebriier), Berlin, 1925, 105 f. I believe, moreover, that the dual sense of the Word, or "Vcrba," as found in Hebraic and other primitive languages, expresses the polarity of the will, or a simultaneous positive and negative willing. Armin Blau gives an example of this in his work: On the Dual Meaning of the Word in the Hebraic (Ueber den Gegensinn der Worte im Hebraischen ) .
9 Wilhelm Vischer: Jahweh, the God of Cain (Jahwe dcr Gott Kains), Munich, 1929, p. 67. Various investigators have already referred to the matriarchal characteristics of Jahwehistic literary sources. Cf. H. Gunkel: "Genesis," fifth chapter, p. 42, where reference is made to further literature.
We can understand Israelitic henotheism which bears the seed of monotheism only if we remember that the struggle of emerging patriarchy against matriarchy belonged to the sexual era, and not to that of spiritual belief of which nothing at all appears in the Old Testament. The feminine character Heva, whose name Gunkel relates to the Phoenician serpent goddess of the lower world, was not only the mother of all living things, but the mortal representative of the ancient earth mother, and the death goddess of the lower world from whom mankind sprang and to whom it returned. Eve's husband originally had no name; as earth symbol, Eve herself was that adama (moist earth) "from which Adam homo ex homo was formed. Adam must return to adama: 'for from her wert thou taken* (3, 19)" (op. cit., p. 65). Hence Cain killed not his father who was anonymous, but his brother. I regard Cain's fratricide as further evidence of the recasting of the old spiritual belief into the ideology of the sexual era, for at this stage Abel was only Cain's concretized Double or twin brother, in whom the second soul of the individual was personified as it had been in a mythological era. In this entire biblical tradition, which was oriented to the present, Cain represented the first man born of woman to lose the spiritual immortality which Abel embodied, who murdered the soul, and therefore became mortal. The objection to the effect that Abel actually died, while Cain whom the matriarchial godhead, Jahweh, deprived of blood vengeance survived,10 is covered by the ideological evolution inherent in the transition from the spiritual to the sexual era. "The name of the immortal spiritual Double who became mortal during this transition was liabal,' which was the biblical term for inconsolable emptiness and the frailty of human existence: ok kol habdl kol adam every Adam is an Abel. The name Abel symbolized the bitter knowledge that outside of paradise there is no life that is not also death" (loc. cit., 42).
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10 Vischer agrees to Stade's thesis that Jahweh deprived Cain of blood vengeance (by the sign of Cain) which he incurred by his murder. See B. Stade's "The sign of Cam' (Das Kainzeichen ) , Z A W, XIV, 1894, 250 ff.
God acquired fatherly traits only in the sexual era, because an earthly father then possessed the "divine" capacity to produce children. In the sources of the Elohists of the arch-father-god this newly accepted capacity is reiterated ad nauseam. In the father god the personal father was depicted not as an ancestor but as a type, that is, as man of the sexual era who had exchanged the new ideology for the old and not, as Freud meant, one who became an exalted physical father following his death by his own default, but one who in the course of history has become the type exalted in the father, the confessor of sexual ideology. Thus at this stage we can understand how the will-god became the world creator described by the patriarchial Elohist of Genesis. In other cultures of the sexual era this process went along with the cleavage of the godhead into its original components, the gods of the higher and lower worlds in whom the paternal and maternal principles were again separated as in the immortal and mortal souls. In the Christian doctrine of the Trinity this cleavage of the individual supreme deity led to an attempt to reunite the three components of the god concept at least ideationally. Yet Jesus remained the human who no longer wanted to become God, and who taught mankind to win individual through a good life.
This cleavage of the unitary god concept spirituality also produced the hero in whom the will-god as culture-hero, healer, and author returned to Earth after his heavenly task of creating the religious godhead had been completed. As an extraordinary bearer of mana the hero intervened in earthly destiny, just as medicine men and sorcerers had done at the magical stage. What had distinguished the strong-willed and successful mana bearer at the spiritual stage was the cause of his downfall during the new stage of belief in God. That is, he not only claimed all the creative power of mana for himself, but used it to set his own personal immortality against that collective, procreative immortality which was embodied in the godhead. He grasped the prerogatives already ceded to the godhead, and basked in this presumptuous likeness to God which led finally to his downfall and death. For through his deeds the hero's will made him immortal; but he lost his life for this, just as Achilles had lost his for his utterance, shameful for a Homeric hero, that he would rather be the most miserable slave on earth than king of the dead. For the soul is collective, just as immortality is procreative, and just as personal mana is no foundation for spiritual belief but only a psychology. Furthermore, as a psychology it is only one of willing and personality, and not a "normal psychology" which corresponds to collectivity. Thus the various currents within scientific psychology, and particularly the two great groups of "average" and personality psychologies, have different sources, the one arising from spiritual belief (animism), and the other from willbelief ( emanism ) . The one is individual, resting on the idea of personal immortality; the other is collective, resting on the idea of religious immortality. The soul represents, as it were, collective willing (to be immortal), which is the will of the individual soul.
The reason why this has not been recognized and utilized psychologically before this time is twofold. First, with rare exceptions, all previous psychologies have only been interpretations of the spiritual, or forms of spiritual belief differing with each stage of consciousness and knowledge; and secondly, the psychological plane itself, in relation to which the spiritual was re-interpreted, was not understood but lay outside psychology. However, this psychological attitude which made possible the new interpretation of the spiritual was just the result of a change of willing from a positive power into a negative inhibition. That is, the psychological basis from which the new interpretation of the spiritual arose was negative will, which all psychology up to Nietzsche's forced into the same course that had brought the will-god over into the ethical principle of religion. Therefore the humanized will-god, the hero, finds his modern counterpart not in the psychologists, but in the poets who immortalize and perpetuate the hero in song, and in the philosophers who seek to prove the immortality of the soul metaphysically. For since will has become negative, it appears first as a problem which is manifested psychologically. Thus, all psychology and particularly its latest phase, psychoanalysis, has been an interpretation of the spiritual in the sense of negative will attitudes, and in relation to the concepts of guilt and sin. In this sense the natural science psychology which culminates in psychoanalysis is but a continuation of religious ideology and a substitute for spiritual belief, which accounts at once for its strength and its weakness. 11
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11 In his The Future of an Illusion (Die Zukunft einer Illusion, 1927), Freud both approached and evaded this problem, because he wished to replace religion with science without recognizing that this goes on continuouslyeven in psychoanalysis.
As long as will is only positive and is manifested in action, religion does not exist in any true sense, nor is psychology possible. The only possible explanation of the phenomenon of positive willing is magical and not psychological in character; it is not an "omnipotence of intellect," such as Freud finds in the inhibited willing of moralistic man, but an omnipotence of will which seems because of its incomprehensibility to stand outside the natural order and within that of the supernatural. Magic was originally a forbidden art, because it was a private one which the individual could use to his own advantage and to the detriment of others. Later it became socialized, because the sorcerer, medicine man, or priest was finally obliged to use it for the good of all. Its original significance as bad will power survived in "black" magic (as different from white or good) even as late as belief in the Devil and the black mass. Here, in the expression of positive will and in its wholesome if fateful consequences, we find the origin of moral differentiation between good and bad, which are allied in all religious systems with the ideas of light and dark. However, at the stage of positive will, it is a matter not of a moral principle but of a vital one. The arch-evils which the strong-willed mana bearer can effect are illness and death. And thus, by the incomprehensible "effect" natural deathevil is effected upon its denied cause which lies in the secret power of will. At this early stage of positive will expression the "cause" which was found for death lay just in man himself, even though it was ascribed to the evil of a foreign will; in the moralistic stage of religion this cause was sought and "found" in the badness and blamability of one's own will.
Originally, therefore, it was clearly a matter of projecting one's own bad will on another which led to death; but this other, evil one soon became not just any mana bearer, but a strong-willed one who otherwise eschewed tests of his will power. The bearer of collective mana, personified by the chieftain, medicine man, sorcerer, etc., became a collective evildoer who appeared in religious systems as Ahriman, Satan, or Devil. According to Persian belief, Ahriman created death, just as the Christian soul which fell to the Devil lost its immortality and really died. I believe that the change, from earthly representatives of bad collective will to the incorporation of will into a moralistic system of good and evil, is comprehensible only on the basis of a continued projection which corresponds to the denial of one's own bad willing. For the collective mana bearer did not always want to be held responsible for the unwholesome consequences of his action, and since he had relinquished a part of his mana to the spirits of the dead, he could make them responsible for all evil and death. But, like the chieftains whose deaths are celebrated even for a thousand days, even some of the dead were stronger in mana than were other ordinary persons such as women, whose mana was thought to be destroyed a few days after death. Both living and shadowy souls subsist on the mana which flows to them, just as the shades of the Homeric lower world were revived by drinking strength-giving blood. Thus energetic mana led to the linguistically related anima, which remained just as invisible as was the divine spouse of its Greek sister Psyche.
The will became soul because its evil effects manifested in death were first ascribed to the living host of mana, and then to its dead host or the soul. But just as the living mana bearer was obliged to use his will power for good and for healing the sick and warding off death, the immortal soul strong in mana changed from a bad demon into a healthbringing angel or guardian spirit. This tendency to change illness into health and evil into good may be traced from the earliest stage of magical will expression, through the conflict between these two principles symbolized by religion, to our own present moralistic, educational system. However, this change originated in the avoidance of death, and in the changing from a bad, death-evoking will to one that was good, wholesome, and not destructive. Therefore, according to Christian belief, the reward for being good was eternal life or immortality of the soul, while the punishment for being bad was the loss of the soul. The bad will causes death; hence, the good will may prevent it.
But originally the bad will was none other than the positive, active will; and man must first be "educated" to dedicate his good willing to the service of the community. It follows that, at the stage where the bad will was no longer projected but was recognized as a subjective power within the individual, will itself had to be regarded as evil, guilty, and morally damned. However, since a psychological attitude itself was possible only at this stage of subjective awareness of will, psychology emerged under the dominance of moral principle, from which it is not yet free. Nietzsche has been the only one so far to sense this problem and to try to free both philosophy and psychology from the ban of morality. Freud's attempt to break through this vicious circle failed because he was prejudiced with a natural science ideology; he therefore recognized only the sexual manifestations of positive will power, and fell back into the morality which had been bound up inextricably with the problem since the sexual era.
We return now to our earlier explanations of the soul, in which we followed its development from an impotent shadow of the body to a fertile germ of life that included even the power of mana. If also the mana theory is now extended to reproductive processes as of the time they began to play a decisive role, it would be a mistake to identify theory and process as Freud has done in his libido theory based on sexual ideology. For the animistic world view stressed the supernatural in the concept of mana as well as in the idea of the soul. In the immortality ideology of sexuality, man found a possibility of uniting individual will and collective soul. But, from the beginning, both the individual and procreative aspects of sexuality were separated, and they have remained so in spite of all the attempts of religion, morals, and science to unite them. The sexual act was an expression of will power and life energy; reproduction symbolized a loss of mana-laden spiritual stuff, and death. Abstinence from reproduction aimed at conservation of spiritually powerful mana, just as the compulsive neurotic currently abstains from sexual intercourse in order not to die, and just as the neurasthenic fears death as a result of the sexual act. Behind moral guilt feeling is the primitive fear of death, to which Freud came much closer in his original theory of anxiety neurosis (1895) than in all his subsequent psychological explanations, which only attempted to soften the impact of this fundamental insight. For the whole sexual theory of the neuroses or of anxiety was only a "therapeutic" and not a psychological theory, just as the sexual era's acceptance of procreative immortality consoled and saved man, who had lost his belief in individual immortality. Animistic man abstained from procreation in order to preserve his soul material for himself, yet affirmed his individual life strength in the sexual act as in other pleasurable acts of will. In the sexual era, reproduction was required because it served procreative immortality, but the sexual act itself was avoided because it robbed man of his strength. In a word, reproduction, which had been dangerous at first, came into favor, and sexuality, which was originally a proof of strength, became tabu.
This moralistic revaluation of both aspects of sex may be understood only on the basis of willing. Since will power with its unwholesome and wholesome effects corresponded to life power or mana, the negation of willing as a bad power finally led to a negation of life. The denial and projection of bad will power onto others, onto the dead, and onto God, allowed the individual a positive expression of his will; with the subjective recognition of bad will, will power as such, and that power to live which manifests itself as will, had to be denied. Thus, as an expression of will, sexuality became evil, guilty, and a cause of death; all of these characteristics had formerly been ascribed to the will. Since will could bring about death, it became labeled as bad in itself. Yet it did not simply disappear; instead it became transformed into a negative power manifested as guilt feeling, and interpreted or explained causally under the concept of sin. This was the beginning of psychology, which only deals further with the broken, denied will and with guilt as a moral phenomenon, now shorn of its former connotations of power. Parallel with this development there was the loss of naive belief in immortality and the collective soul, which were replaced by death anxiety. Individual guilt feeling now bound the individual to the group, as belief in the collective soul had formerly done; and, like the will, sexuality became a moral instead of an energetic phenomenon, whose extreme form appears in the contemporary individual love experience. As an expression of the bad will, sexuality had to be morally justified by other individuals, since they disapproved of it and condoned reproduction only within a family structure derived from sexual ideology. The guilt that bound one to others corresponded to a psychological interpretation of the death anxiety, which appeared as a reaction to will-action branded as evil. Since will-expression necessarily led to guilt it soon became recognized that one's own bad will feeling, which had been projected on foreign or supernatural wills now threatened the life of the ego.
Just as the recognition of death invoked the animistic era, and that of procreative processes the sexual era, moralistic interpretation of one's own willing as the basis of evil produced the psychological era. For only in the last instance was it a matter of psychological knowledge in the psychological sense; in the instances of death and sexuality it was a matter of recognizing previously denied objective facts. Just as animistic theory and magical life practices represented the reaction of the current world view to the knowledge of death, the truly religious system and the moral conduct of life which corresponds to it followed recognition of the will. In both instances sexual knowledge supplied the material, or the means and content, for recasting the old ideology into a new one. This knowledge had a positive function only during the first shift from a belief in the collective soul to individual procreative immortality, because, as a consolation for a lost naive belief in immortality, it promised continuation of life in one's own descendants. The next turning point, which resulted from denial of the ideology of procreative immortality, was characterized by the emergence of a purely religious ideology from the fusion of abandoned stages of the soul- and will-gods into a moralistic godhead symbolic of the new ego at the stage of will recognition. This evolutionary stage embodied by the Jewish deity ended with the complete collapse of antiquity in the conflict of these different ideologies, and with the beginnings of Christian ideology, which reached back to original spiritual belief and which man has long held as his last bulwark against psychological self-knowledge.
This self-knowledge, which originally concerned the will and its problems, soon turned from the ideological conflict projected onto the religious godhead, to its own consciousness and processes; and it became the object of philosophical speculation long before any psychology existed. Following a century-long detour into epistemology, Schopenhauer finally returned from the ethics of practical life conduct to the problem of willing, and thus reopened psychology's original domain. Only Schopenhauer made causal in the sense of natural science this willing in which he recognized the basic power of all living which had been characteristic of mana; and, under the pressure of moralistic ideology of negation, Schopenhauer's successor, Nietzsche, postulated will as the source of the personal power characteristic of his "superman," who represented the strong-willed mana bearer in the completely primitive sense. Although Nietzsche actually comprehended the will too specifically, he at least reaffirmed it and freed it from the moral compulsions of religion and philosophy. For both Adler who followed Nietzsche's ideology of power, and Freud who interpreted will sexually, fell back on the moral position which damned the will as bad and detrimental to the individual and society; Jung finally invoked collective morality which justified the will socially.
In my latest works, and especially in Truth and Reality (Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit ) ,I tried to take the positive will as the object of psychology, and to consider it apart from its extra-psychological contents. I recognized that the deepest root of morality was not a problem of content but one of willing, and I portrayed the knowledge of evil and the guilt of willing as the fundamental bases of evil and its attendant concepts of guilt and sin. Starting from the analysis of a purely psychological problem, I arrived at a "will causality" which I contrasted with the causality concept of natural science, and which I may now round out from the spiritual standpoint. For under will causality I conceive of willing as an apparently spontaneous and incommensurable cause of visible effects, in relation to which matters of evil defy explanation, since their removal seems possible when their causes are discovered. Among these evil effects the most outstanding was death, for which various "causes" have been found or discovered from time to time. The first causality problem of man was death; but here the finding of a cause served to deny the fact.
